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INTRODUCTION
Debates about rent regulation are not known for their nuance.
The world tends to divide into fierce opponents and strong
supporters.
But within these debates, stakeholders and
commentators rarely engage with the details of local ordinances, even
though those details may significantly affect outcomes for tenants,
landlords, and broader housing markets. This Article expands the
landscape of contemporary rent regulation debates by articulating
and cataloging the numerous choices jurisdictions must make in
designing and implementing rent regulation programs. It shows that,
far from being monolithic, rent regulation programs comprise a range
of diverse schemes. The dearth of research examining the details of
these schemes, however, has hindered policymakers from
understanding their available choices and the trade-offs among them.
Part I of this Article reviews the overarching goals of rent
regulation and explains how some of these goals may be in tension
with each other. Parts II through IV outline the choices that local
policymakers must make in enacting and implementing rent
regulation ordinances and highlight the wide variety of regimes that
jurisdictions with rent regulation have adopted in practice. Part II
illustrates the choices that define the basic features of rent regulation:
which units are to be regulated, how they become deregulated, and
how jurisdictions implement and oversee these processes. Part III
tackles the many components of annual rent increases, from how
jurisdictions set annual, across-the-board increases to the exceptions
and adjustments that may arise in cases of vacancy, building or unit
improvements, or hardship. Part IV examines the ways in which rent
regulation schemes interact with other tenant protections, chiefly
safeguards against harassment and eviction, as well as protections for
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vulnerable groups. Part V calls for new empirical research to study
the effects of different regulatory features.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE GOALS OF RENT REGULATION
A. Stated Goals of Rent Regulation Programs
State and local governments have authorized or adopted rent
regulations to serve a number of different goals. One objective of
rent regulation is to protect existing tenants from rent increases that
would make their housing unaffordable. New York City puts that
goal most starkly, justifying its program as necessary to “prevent
exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental
agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other
disruptive practices tending to produce threats to the public health,
safety and general welfare.”1 Similarly, Oakland, California states its
purposes is to “provid[e] relief to residential tenants in Oakland by
limiting rent increases for existing tenants.”2 Washington, D.C. lists
“protect[ing] low- and moderate-income tenants from the erosion of
their income from increased housing costs” as the first of its five
objectives.3 D.C. is unusual in specifying that its goal is to protect
tenants with low and moderate incomes.4
Landlords’ ability to skimp on maintenance and repairs and
arbitrarily evict tenants protected by rent regulations undermines the
basic goal of protecting existing tenants. To address this issue and
support tenant stability more generally, rent regulation programs aim
to prevent evictions, harassment, and decreases in services or
maintenance.5
New York City’s Rent Guidelines Board lists

1. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501, recodified in § 26-502 (2018). The New York
State legislature passed significant reforms to the rent regulation system in June 2019,
S.B. S6548, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), as this Article was being written, and this
Article makes efforts to address both the old and new systems.
2. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.010 (2019).
3. D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985).
4. CITY OF UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(D) (2017). The stated purpose
of Union City, New Jersey’s ordinance, by comparison, “is to maintain rental
apartments that are affordable for mid and lower income residents of the City.” Id. §
334-1(F).
5. PRASANNA RAJASEKARAN ET AL., URB. INST., RENT CONTROL: WHAT DOES
THE RESEARCH TELL US ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL ACTION? 1 (2019)
[hereinafter
URB.
INST.],
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99646/rent_control._what_does_t
he_research_tell_us_about_the_effectiveness_of_local_action_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SF2H-M4YX].
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protecting “habitability and security of tenure” as one of its goals.6
One of the objectives in D.C.’s rent regulation statute is to “continue
to improve the administrative machinery for the resolution of
disputes and controversies between housing providers and tenants.”7
Union City, New Jersey’s ordinance explains that, at the time its
passage, tenants were reluctant to complain about exorbitant rent
increases or the deterioration of housing without protections like just
cause eviction.8
A number of jurisdictions articulate a broader intent to avoid or
alleviate the crisis in housing affordability. San Francisco’s Rent
Board describes the purpose of its program as “alleviat[ing] the city’s
housing crisis.”9 Union City’s rent regulation ordinance states that
“[u]nless residential rents of tenants are regulated and controlled,
there will be an inevitable housing crisis that will inevitably lead to
homelessness.”10 Takoma Park, Maryland’s rent regulation website
describes the program as “designed to preserve the city’s affordable
housing stock.”11
Some jurisdictions adopt rent regulations in part to preserve the
diversity of their populations. Takoma Park’s rent regulations are
designed in part to “maintain economic and ethnic diversity.”12
Union City, New Jersey’s rent regulations are justified in part by “the
public interest to have a cross section of people residing in Union City

6. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., MAIN FEATURES OF RENT STABILIZATION 59
(2010),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/history/mainfeaturesofrs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5UK-CFAD]. According to the Rent Guidelines Board, the
purpose is three-fold: (1) to “preserve the basic affordability of rental housing;” (2) to
protect “habitability and security of tenure;” and (3) to produce “fair returns for
affected owners.” Id.
7. D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985).
8. UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(D) (2017) (“The fear of being evicted
without just cause and being forced to seek housing in such a market discourages
Union City tenants from complaining about exorbitant increases in rent and about
the continued deterioration of housing.”). New Jersey has since legislated just-cause
eviction protections statewide. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:18-61.1–61.12 (1988) (“the
Anti-Eviction Act”).
9. The Mission of the Rent Board, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F. RENT BOARD,
https://sfrb.org/mission-rent-board [https://perma.cc/A7WS-Q58J] (last visited Oct. 2,
2019).
10. UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(E) (2017).
11. Rent Stabilization, CITY OF TAKOMA PARK HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.,
https://takomaparkmd.gov/government/housing-and-community-development/rentalhousing/rent-stabilization/ [https://perma.cc/KUW7-NJYG] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
12. Id.
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across all socio-economic backgrounds.”13 Oakland defines the
purpose of its rent adjustment program as “foster[ing] fair housing for
a diverse population of renters.”14
Some of these goals may be in tension. For example, protecting
the affordability of the existing housing stock may make housing
overall less affordable by discouraging, rather than encouraging, the
construction of new rental housing;15 the continuing operation of
rental properties as rentals;16 or adequate maintenance and
rehabilitation of the rental stock.17 Additionally, protecting existing
tenants may undermine, rather than advance, the diversity of the
population.18 Further, rent regulation might facilitate discrimination
by creating excess demand, thereby making it easier for landlords to
handpick their tenants.19
Accordingly, jurisdictions try to balance the aim of providing
tenants with stable and affordable housing with concern for market
incentives and landlords’ abilities to earn fair returns on their
investments. Some make a point of stating that the purposes of their
rent regulation programs include “provid[ing] incentives for the
construction of new rental units and the rehabilitation of vacant

13. UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(D) (2017).
14. Rent
Adjustment
Program,
CITY
OF
OAKLAND,
https://www.oaklandca.gov/topics/rent-adjustment-program [https://perma.cc/VN4PCPRW] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
15. See Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?, 9 J. ECON.
PERSP. 99, 99 (1995). But see John I. Gilderbloom & Lin Ye, Thirty Years of Rent
Control: A Survey of New Jersey Cities, 29 J. URB. AFF. 207, 211 (2007) (finding no
statistically significant relationship between rent control policies and new
construction in New Jersey between 1990 and 2000).
16. See generally Rebecca Diamond et al., The Effects of Rent Control

Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco

(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24181, 2017).
17. See, e.g., Richard Arnott & Elizaveta Shevyakhova, Tenancy Rent Control
and Credible Commitment in Maintenance, 47 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 72, 82–83
(2014); David H. Autor et al., Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of
Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 122 J. POL. ECON. 661, 673–74 (2014);
David P. Sims, Out of Control: What Can We Learn from the End of Massachusetts
Rent Control?, 61 J. URB. ECON. 129, 143–46 (2007).
18. See Ed Glaeser, Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation?, 10 SWED. ECON.
POL’Y REV. 179, 199 (2003); URB. INST., supra note 5, at 2, 7. But see Diamond et al.,
supra note 16, at 3. Diversity of the population depends on how the incomes, race,
and ethnicity of renters whose buildings are rent regulated in a city compare with
those of the renters in unregulated buildings, or those of newcomers who may have
trouble securing a home to rent.
19. See Richard B. Mackenzie & Dwight R. Lee, How Economists Understate the
Damage from Rent Controls, CATO INST., REG. 22, 22–23 (2019),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2018/12/regulationv41n4-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BJC-8MKG].
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rental units”20 or “encouraging rehabilitation of rental units” and
“investment in new residential rental property.”21 Others specifically
note the importance of allowing landlords subject to the regulation to
make a “fair return,”22 “fair and adequate rents,”23 or a “reasonable
rate of return on their investments.”24 Oakland states that its goals
include “allowing efficient rental property owners the opportunity for
both a fair return on their property and rental income sufficient to
cover the increasing cost of repairs, maintenance, insurance,
employee services, additional amenities, and other costs of
operation.”25
B. Existing Research and Challenges
Studying how well rent regulation serves the goals jurisdictions
articulate for their programs is challenging. Chief among these
obstacles is that rent regulation laws are relatively static, presenting
few opportunities to examine the effects of a change in policy.26 It is
difficult to identify control groups when policies do change because
the properties excluded from regulations within a jurisdiction are
often idiosyncratic.27
Comparisons between jurisdictions are
problematic because cities that adopt changes to rent regulations may
be experiencing very different market pressures than those that do
not change or do not have rent regulation programs.28 Even when
plausible control groups do exist, data on rent and tenant outcomes
are difficult to come by. Finally, because of the potential for
variability in both regulations and market conditions, scholars must
be cautious in assuming the evidence of the effects of rent regulations
from one jurisdiction will generalize to another.
The best evidence we have on the impacts of rent regulation
provides support for the idea that there are trade-offs among the
goals jurisdictions articulate for their programs. Rebecca Diamond,
Timothy McQuade, and Franklin Qian used uniquely comprehensive
data to exploit an expansion of rent controls in San Francisco in

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985).
OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.010 (2019).
MAIN FEATURES OF RENT STABILIZATION, supra note 6, at 59.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.1(b)(6) (2001).
D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985).
OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.010(C) (2019).
Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 7; Rent Adjustment Program, supra note 14.
See Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 7.
Id. at 2.
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1994.29 They found that tenants in rent-regulated units enjoyed lower
rents and, on average, stayed in their homes longer.30 However, rent
regulation prompted some landlords to demolish their units to make
way for new construction or to convert them into other uses.31
Ultimately, this led to a reduction in rental supply, a housing stock
that served higher-income individuals, and higher rents citywide.32
Accordingly, sitting tenants generally benefited, but other renters and
those wanting to move into the city encountered fewer units and
higher rents.33 Further, they found that tenants who lived in areas
with the highest rent appreciation and who had only been at their
current address for a few years were less likely to remain at their
addresses than tenants in the control group of similar buildings not
subject to the expansion of rent regulation.34
Similarly, Brian Asquith used an instrumental variable approach35
to study whether increases in San Francisco housing prices led owners
of rent-regulated buildings or units to convert their properties to
unregulated uses.36 He found that landlords respond to rising prices
by withdrawing their units and buildings from the rent-regulated
system.37
Specifically, landlords convert their properties to

29. See id. at 5.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 12, 26–27.
Taken together, we see rent control increased property investment, spurred
the demolition and reconstruction of new buildings, generated conversion of
rental units to owner occupied housing, and caused a decline of the number
of renters per building. All of these responses lead to a housing stock which
caters to higher income individuals. Rent control has actually fueled the
gentrification of San Francisco, the exact opposite of the policy’s intended
goal.
Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 25–27.
34. See generally id.
35. Instrumental variable estimation is a statistical approach that helps to identify
causal relationships. See Kenneth A. Bollen, Instrumental Variables in Sociology and
the
Social
Sciences,
38
ANN.
REV.
SOC.
37,
38
(2012),
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-150141
[https://perma.cc/P3EE-MPCV]. A valid instrument is a variable that affects a key
explanatory variable but only affects the outcome of interest indirectly, through that
explanatory variable. See id. at 37.
36. See generally Brian Asquith, Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing Supply
Under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in San Francisco (Upjohn Inst. for
Emp’t
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
19-296,
2019),
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1314&context=up_workingpa
pers [https://perma.cc/4A9Q-QJ5H].
37. Id. at 5, 8–9.
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condominiums or other ownership forms, demolish them, or occupy
them as their own homes.38 Asquith also found that when the city
tried to limit such conversions, landlords responded by taking more
tenants to court for at-fault evictions.39
David P. Sims used the end of rent control after a ballot
referendum in Massachusetts to study the effects of rent control in the
Boston metropolitan area.40 He found that ending rent control had
little effect on new construction in the years immediately following
decontrol.41 But it resulted in many units switching from owner to
tenant occupancy, suggesting that rent control had encouraged
owners to convert rental units to other uses to avoid regulations.42
Although there was little evidence that the end of rent control was
associated with a reduction in major maintenance problems such as
plumbing and heating failures, it was associated with a reduction in
“chronic aesthetic” issues, such as peeling paint, suggesting that rent
control had discouraged maintenance of the regulated stock.43
In sum, existing research suggests it can be difficult, if not
impossible, both to protect existing tenants from rising rents and
evictions and to ensure the affordability, quality, and longevity of the
rental housing stock. Experimenting with different combinations of
features and strategies might offer new insights that can help
policymakers better balance these multiple goals, but exploring these
possibilities first requires a detailed look at the design choices
available.
II. FEATURES AND TRADE-OFFS OF RENT REGULATION: DEFINING
THE REGULATED UNIVERSE
Observers, both critics and advocates, tend to regard the adoption
of rent regulation as a binary choice; however, policymakers must
make a host of decisions when enacting rent regulations. Legislators
must decide, among other things, how broadly the program will apply;
how annual increases will be determined; and the rights of tenants in
regulated units. All of these choices involve difficult trade-offs.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 40–41.
40. See generally Sims, supra note 17.
41. Id. at 140–43.
42. Id. Note that effects found are a result of ending rent control and may not
apply to the introduction or continuation of rent controls. Id.
43. Id. at 143–44.
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Because many states prohibit or preempt rent regulation, the
number of jurisdictions without rent regulations dwarfs the number
with them. Thirty-two states expressly ban all forms of rent control,
while nine others allow it in principle but have no rent-regulating
jurisdictions.44 Only California, the District of Columbia, Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, and, very recently, Oregon, have any
jurisdictions with rent regulation programs.45 Nevertheless, as the
following sections will illustrate, there is considerable diversity among
the existing rent regulation programs.46 The survey reveals that a
wide range of programs fall under the umbrella of rent regulation,
and shows that jurisdictions considering implementing new rent
regulation programs have a variety of models to choose from.
This Article explores the policy choices jurisdictions with rent
regulation programs have made, beginning with the choices that
shape the basic features of a rent regulation program and the universe
of regulated properties. Accordingly, this Part explores the breadth of
rent regulation programs, the various ways in which units can become
deregulated, and how different jurisdictions monitor and enforce the
requirements of regulation.
A. Breadth of Program

i. The Universe of Regulated Properties
The first key decision is which properties to regulate. Casting a
broader net protects more sitting tenants but risks discouraging
investment in new construction.47 Policymakers can restrict the scope
of regulations by covering only those buildings built after a certain
date;48 by exempting small or owner-occupied buildings;49 or by

44. NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, RENT CONTROL BY STATE LAW (2019),
https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/advocacy/rent-control/Rent-Control-by-StateChart.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQF-MNM2].
45. See id.; see, e.g., S. Res. 608, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); URB. INST.,
supra note 5, at 3.
46. See infra Parts II–IV.
47. See Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 3 (explaining that San Francisco
legislators exempted new construction from rent control due to concerns that rent
control would discourage new development).
48. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.030(A)(5) (2019); D.C. CODE §
42–3502.05(2) (1985); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1(A)(4) (2018).
49. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.030(A)(8); D.C. CODE § 42–
3502.05(3); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1(A)(1).
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excluding high-rent units or high-income tenants from coverage.50
Jurisdictions have made a variety of decisions about which homes to
regulate. The proportion of all rental units that are rent-regulated
varies considerably by city, from approximately 45% of rental units in
New York City to 80% of multifamily units in Los Angeles.51 These
figures are not static but rather a function of any given program’s
mechanisms for entry to and exit from the regulated market.
Additional units may become regulated as a condition of participation
for tax incentives or other programs designed to expand the supply of
affordable or market rate housing.52 The deregulation mechanisms
explored later in this Part allow units to exit the regulated market.
Regulating the rents charged in new buildings is particularly
problematic, as such restrictions might encourage conversions to
owner-occupied housing, leading to a reduced supply of affordable
rental housing.53 Further, the high cost of construction and the strong
demand for housing in many cities means that unless new buildings
are subsidized or built as part of an inclusionary housing program,
they will rarely provide homes affordable to low- and moderateincome renters.54 Regulating rents in new buildings thus will confer
benefits on wealthier tenants least in need of protection.
Most systems do not cover new buildings, other than those
accepting rent regulation as a condition for a benefit.55 The date that

50. High-Rent Vacancy and High-Rent High-Income Deregulation, N.Y. STATE
HOMES & COMMUNITY RENEWAL (2018), https://hcr.ny.gov/high-rent-vacancy-highincome-deregulation [https://perma.cc/2A9L-ZAYL].
51. See Recommendation Report, CITY OF L.A. DEP’T CITY PLANNING exhibit
B.1, 7 (2018), https://planning.lacity.org/ordinances/docs/HomeSharing/StaffRept.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WYN-4LQ6]. In 2017, 44% of all New York City units were rentstabilized and 1% were subject to rent control. See id. at 7, n.5; N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF
HOUS. PRES. & DEV., SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY
HOUSING
AND
VACANCY
SURVEY
11
(2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/2017-hvs-initial-findings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TS22-JMCZ].
52. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #41 TAX ABATEMENTS
(2019), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/09/FACT 20SHEET 2041.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SCV8-GBAZ]. In New York, for example, rent stabilization applies
to buildings that receive J-51 and 421-a tax benefits. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 9, §§ 2520.11(o)–(p) (2014).
53. See Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 12, 30.
54. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL
HOUSING: EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR DIVERSE AND GROWING DEMAND 17 fig.14
(2015),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/americas_rental_housing_2015_web.p
df [https://perma.cc/8AP3-R78E].
55. For an example of a jurisdiction providing benefits in exchange for agreement
to rent-regulated status, see New York’s “421-a” tax abatement program. N.Y. COMP.
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determines which existing units are covered is usually right before
rent regulation legislation passed. The earliest of these is New York
state, where rent stabilization does not apply to buildings built after
1974 unless those buildings receive certain property tax abatements,56
while Oakland and Jersey City use 1983,57 and Oregon’s recently
passed legislation exempts properties built in the last 15 years.58
Other jurisdictions choose not to exclude new construction
categorically and instead provide only an exemption period from
regulation, after which new buildings enter the regulated market.
Newark’s rent regulation ordinance, for example, does not apply to
newly-constructed multiple dwellings either for 30 years following
construction completion or for the building’s initial mortgage loan’s
amortization period, whichever is less.59 Takoma Park grants a much
shorter exemption of only five years.60 Jersey City gives exemptions
only to new buildings located in designated “redevelopment areas,”
intending to encourage the rehabilitation or replacement of
substandard housing in existing communities.61 The extent to which
these exemption periods help moderate the disincentive to build new

CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(p) (2014); FACT SHEET #41 TAX ABATEMENTS,
supra note 52.
56. See Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAW § 5(a)(5) (2019).
57. See OAKLAND, CAL. MUN. CODE § 8.22.030 (2019); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018).
58. See S. Res. 608, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019).
59. NEWARK, N.J., ORDINANCE § 19:2-18.1 (2019).
60. TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUN. CODE § 6.20.030(A)(3) (2007).
61. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1(A)(4) (2018) (exempting
“[n]ewly constructed dwellings with 25 or more dwelling units located within a
redevelopment area as defined in Section 5 of the Redevelopment Agencies Law,
N.J.S.A. 40:55C-5(o), for which the City Council has approved a redevelopment plan,
in accordance with Section 17 of the Redevelopment Agencies Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55C17.”). The relevant section defines “Urban redevelopment area[s]” as “previously
developed portions of areas: (1) Delineated on the State Plan Policy Map (SPPM) as
the Metropolitan Planning Area (PA1), Designated Centers, Cores or Nodes; (2)
Designated as CAFRA Centers, Cores or Nodes; (3) Designated as Urban Enterprise
Zones; and (4) Designated as Urban Coordinating Council Empowerment
Neighborhoods.” Id. § 345-74(2); see also Redevelopment, N.J. FUTURE,
https://www.njfuture.org/issues/development/redevelopment/ [https://perma.cc/T2APMTJJ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) (“Redevelopment is reinvestment in neighborhoods
and commercial areas to replace or repair previously developed buildings or plots of
land that are in substandard condition or are no longer useful in their current state.
Redevelopment sites can be found in urban, suburban and rural locations, as well as
on ‘brownfields’ that may be contaminated by a previous industrial use.
Redevelopment is a core component of smart growth because it promotes
development in existing communities with infrastructure and away from critical
environmental lands and resources.”).
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homes has not been well-researched. Furthermore, even categorically
exempting new buildings may not address the disincentive to
investment. Investment may still decrease if market actors fear the
trigger will be moved forward with subsequent legislation.
Jurisdictions may also choose to exempt small rental buildings.
Many exclude single-family homes.62 Others exclude dwellings below
a certain size. For example, rent stabilization applies only to
buildings with six or more units in New York City;63 and four or
more units in Jersey City.64 Los Angeles differentiates between
single-family homes occupying a single parcel, which are not subject
to rent regulation, and those that are two or more to a parcel, which
are.65
The justification for such exemptions is that, unless they own many
buildings, owners of small buildings generally have less market power
over rents and should not be burdened with the administrative costs
of regulation.66 If they find regulations to be burdensome, owners of
small rental properties may find it easier to convert their apartments
into condominiums. In studying the expansion of rent regulation in
San Francisco to some buildings with fewer than five apartments,
Diamond, McQuade, and Qian found that newly covered buildings
were 8% more likely to convert to a condominium or other form of
for-sale unit than the small buildings that remained unregulated.67
The D.C. Code distinguishes between corporate and individual
owners and between number of units owned and building size,
exempting rental buildings owned by individual — rather than

62. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL. MUN. CODE § 8.22.030 (2019) (exemptions in
ordinances); D.C. CODE § 42-3502.05 (1985) (same); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018) (same).
63. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504 (2018); see also Rent Stabilized Buildings
NYC
RENT
GUIDELINES
BOARD,
List,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/resources/rent-stabilized-buildinglists.page#tell [https://perma.cc/P8ZT-B9ZU] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
64. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018).
65. The ordinance thus applies to duplex conversions to condominiums as well as
garage conversions to residential occupancy. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 151.00–
.30 (2011). California state law only allows jurisdictions to apply rent regulation to
properties with two or more units. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 151.07(A)(1)(a) (1989).
66. See Rebecca Diamond, What Does Economic Evidence Tell Us About the
Effects of Rent Control?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Diamond,
Economic Evidence], https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-economicevidence-tell-us-about-the-effects-of-rent-control/
[https://perma.cc/HR33-Q9ZK]
(“Smaller multi-family buildings were exempt from this 1979 law change since they
were viewed as more ‘mom and pop’ ventures, and did not have market power over
rents.”).
67. Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 12.
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corporate — landlords who own four or fewer units.68 Until May
2019, by contrast, Oakland’s ordinance distinguished based on owner
occupancy, exempting two- or three-unit buildings for at least two
years.69

ii. Tenant Income Qualifications
One of the common goals of rent regulation programs is to provide
affordable rental housing, a target that is particularly difficult to reach
for lower-income households.70 There is also a persistent public
discomfort with wealthier households’ benefiting from rent
Despite this, there does not appear to be any
regulation.71
jurisdiction that regulates rents only when tenants have lower
incomes. Several arguments can be made for not targeting incomes,
one being the risk that landlords will avoid renting to lower-income
households. Means testing can also impose high administrative
costs,72 many of which can be avoided by using proxies for wealth to
limit the applicability of rent regulation, such as exemptions for

68. See D.C. CODE § 42-3502.05(a)(3) (1985).
69. See OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.030 (2019); Ali Tadayon, Oakland
Scraps Rent Control Exemption for Owner-Occupied Duplexes, EAST BAY TIMES
(May 24, 2019, 4:16 AM) https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2019/05/23/oakland-scrapsrent-control-exemption-for-owner-occupied-duplexes [https://perma.cc/8QX7-78AJ].
70. In New York City, proportions of low-income households in rent stabilized
housing are higher than in unregulated households and the proportions of rent
burdened households are similar. See C.R. WAICKMAN ET AL., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF
HOUS. PRES. & DEV., AFFORDABILITY OF RENT STABILIZED UNITS (2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/rent-regulation-memo-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7Z4-EVWK].
71. See, e.g., Jeremiah Budin, Millionaires Living in Rent-Stabilized Apartments,
CURBED
N.Y.
(Apr.
30,
2014,
2:25
PM),
https://ny.curbed.com/2014/4/30/10107290/millionaires-living-in-rent-stabilizedapartments [https://perma.cc/K8HN-PCHT]; James Fanelli, Rent-Stabilized
Apartments Are Being Occupied by Millionaires, Records Show, DNAINFO (Apr. 30,
2014, 6:41 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20140430/new-york-city/rentstabilized-apartments-are-being-occupied-by-millionaires-records-show/
[https://perma.cc/6UVQ-4BT9]; Scott James, How the Rich Get Richer, Rental
Edition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/us/sanfrancisco-rent-control-and-unintended-consequences.html
[https://perma.cc/5TSZK377]; Peter D. Salins & Gerard Mildner, Does Rent Control Help the Poor?, CITY
J. (1991), https://www.city-journal.org/html/does-rent-control-help-poor-12772.html
[https://perma.cc/N9BV-N2GJ].
72. See Timothy Besley, Means Testing Versus Universal Provision in Poverty
Alleviation Programs, 57 ECONOMICA 119, 119–20 (1990); Wim Van Oorschot,

Targeting Welfare: On the Functions and Dysfunctions of Means Testing in Social
Policy, in WORLD POVERTY: NEW POLICIES TO DEFEAT AN OLD ENEMY 171, 174–75
(David Gordon & Peter Townsend eds., 2002).

1054

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

single-family homes.73 Choosing to forego means testing also has the
potential to expand political support for rent regulation programs by
increasing the number of households with a stake in those programs.74
Although no jurisdictions currently means-test tenants moving into
rent-regulated units, a bill was introduced in 2018 in the Illinois
General Assembly that explored this possibility, overturning the
state’s ban on rent regulation and requiring means-tested rent
regulation.75 The provisions were eliminated from the version of the
bill introduced in 2019,76 but called for regional rent control boards to
set targeted rent caps for “Tier 1” households earning 60% or less of a
county’s Area Median Income (AMI) and “Tier 2” households
earning 120% or less of AMI.77 The 2018 bill would also have also
provided an income tax credit for landlords renting to Tier 1 or Tier 2
households,78 which could reduce the likelihood that such measures
would otherwise disincentivize landlords from accepting low-income
tenants. Creating such a granular means-testing scheme would
require substantial administrative investment.
Until recent reforms eliminated this method of decontrol,79 New
York State balanced the need to target benefits and the costs of
administering means-testing by adopting a “high-rent/high-income”
deregulation.80 A unit became deregulated when the income of the

73. Some jurisdictions — including Maryland, New Jersey, and Indiana — provide
benefits to low-income renters, such as renters’ tax credits, that are conditioned on
income, but do not impose means testing in their rent regulation programs. Because
such credits typically are administered through the income tax system, conditioning
them on income is relatively easy. See NJ Income Tax Property Tax
Deduction/Credit for Homeowners and Tenants, N.J. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/njit35.shtml [https://perma.cc/583F-QN6Q]
(last visited Oct. 2, 2019); Renters’ Tax Credits, MD. DEP’T ASSESSMENTS &
TAXATION, https://dat.maryland.gov/realproperty/Pages/Renters’-Tax-Credits.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WZ3E-XZGA] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019); Tax Deduction Details,
IND.
DEP’T
REVENUE,
https://www.in.gov/dor/5863.htm#renters
[https://perma.cc/XVD5-W7SZ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
74. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable
Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 428–29
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
75. S.B. 3512, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018).
76. H.B. 2192, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019).
77. Ill. S.B. 3512 § 5.
78. Id. § 905.
79. As previously noted, the New York State legislature passed significant
reforms to the rent regulation system in June 2019, S.B. S6548, 2019–20 Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2019), as this Article was being written.
80. See N.Y. DEP’T OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, DEREGULATION RENT AND
INCOME
THRESHOLDS
(2018),
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household occupying the unit exceeded $200,000 for the two
preceding years, and the unit reached a Deregulation Rent Threshold
(DRT).81 To initiate the deregulation process, the owner of a
regulated apartment was required to serve a tenant with an Income
Certification Form, which obligated the tenant to certify whether the
household income exceeded $200,000 in the two preceding years.82 If
so, the owner could file an Owner’s Petition for Deregulation with the
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, which would issue an
order deregulating the unit when the current lease expired.83 Thus,
New York’s method of excluding high-income households from rent
regulation was a blunt instrument that is relatively simple to
administer. Additionally, this system removed a unit permanently
from the regulated housing stock, even if a future tenant’s income was
lower than $200,000.84 This mechanism was done away with in June
2019, however, and there does not appear to be any other
jurisdictions that deregulates units based on high rents or high
household incomes.
B. Deregulation
The next set of relevant decisions concern when, if at all, landlords
may be allowed to remove units from regulation. More lenient
deregulation makes it easier to decrease the stock of rent-regulated
housing. But providing more flexibility to landlords may help to limit
the extent to which rent regulation dampens overall investment in
housing. Jurisdictions may decide to condition deregulation on a
landlord’s paying tenants’ relocation costs or contributing to a fund to
support affordable housing. Deciding on the appropriate levels of
compensation is challenging. Payments may be ineffective if they are
too low, doing little to either slow the pace of deregulation or to
contribute to addressing broader affordability challenges
meaningfully. If they are too high, they are likely to discourage
investment.
Rent regulation ordinances specify the mechanisms through which
units leave the regulated market, and the scope of these provisions

https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/10/deregulationrentincomethreshold.p
df [https://perma.cc/R3ZY-ZZ3H].
81. The DRT was $2774.76 before it was abolished in 2019. See id.
82. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504.3 (repealed 2019) (providing an example of
how courts apply the Income Certification Form requirement); DEREGULATION
RENT AND INCOME THRESHOLDS, supra note 80 (providing 2019 DRT).
83. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504.3 (repealed 2019).
84. See DEREGULATION RENT AND INCOME THRESHOLDS, supra note 80.
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plays a significant role in shaping a jurisdiction’s regulated housing
stock. Until recently, New York City’s high-rent and high-income
deregulation85 was an example of one such mechanism. A unit could
also become deregulated if the rent reached a Deregulation
Threshold, which was $2774.76 as of early 2019.86 In 2017, the median
asking rent for units advertised for lease was $2695.87 The new law
passed in June 2019 also eliminated this high-rent vacancy decontrol.
Units in New York City may still become deregulated through
conversion into a cooperative or condominium,88 substantial
rehabilitation of a substandard building,89 conversion to commercial
or professional use, condemnation, or demolition.90 Finally, landlords
may, in some cases, evict tenants if they move into the property
themselves, and may offer their tenants “buyouts” or compensatory
payments for leaving.91 Many of these provisions are common across
jurisdictions. However, the Oakland City Council recently removed
“substantial rehabilitation” as a mechanism for deregulation.92 The
Ellis Act also plays a significant role in shaping deregulation in
California, allowing owners to exit rent control if they take units off
the rental market entirely to sell or live in.93 A 2007 Los Angeles
ordinance requires landlords who demolish rent-stabilized units under
the Ellis Act and construct rental units on the same property within

50.

85. See supra Part II.A.ii.
86. High-Rent Vacancy and High-Rent High-Income Deregulation, supra note

87. NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOODS
IN
2017
24
(2017),
http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_2017_Full_2018-08-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FT6E-U6K2].
88. Tenants whose buildings are being converted into cooperatives or
condominiums must be offered an opportunity to purchase their units and, even
following conversion, sitting tenants’ units remain rent-regulated. See N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, §§ 18.1, 23.1 (2019).
89. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(e)(3) (2019).
90. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO THE RENT STABILIZED HOUSING
STOCK
IN
NEW
YORK
CITY
IN
2017
5
(2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/changes18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B9QR-9PEJ].
91. Diamond, Economic Evidence, supra note 66, at 3 (“In practice, these transfer
payments from landlords are quite common and can be quite large.”).
92. Ali Tadayon, Oakland Moves Toward Ending Rent Control Exemption, EAST
BAY TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2018/09/20/oaklandmoves-toward-ending-rent-control-exemption/ [https://perma.cc/23EQ-QPBS]; see
also Oakland, Cal., Ordinance No. 13523 (Mar. 29, 2019) (amending Oakland
Municipal Code § 8.22.030 to eliminate the substantially rehabilitation exemption).
93. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7060–7060.7 (2019).
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five years to replace the demolished units with the same number of
regulated units or 20% of all new units, whichever is greater.94
Abolition of rent regulation is, of course, the most absolute form of
deregulation. Such an abolition occurred in Massachusetts when
voters approved a 1994 ballot referendum ending rent control
statewide. At the time, three cities in Massachusetts — Boston,
Cambridge, and Brookline — had rent regulation ordinances.95
C. Tracking and Enforcement
Jurisdictions also need to decide how to monitor and enforce
whatever regulations they choose to adopt.
Monitoring and
enforcement may take place at the state level, as in New York,96 or
through local governments, as in California and New Jersey.97
Monitoring compliance requires a registry of rent-regulated units and
an effective system for monitoring increases. Absent a registry of
regulated buildings, it is difficult for tenants to know the level of rent
they should be paying. In New York City, owners must register rentstabilized buildings98 and file annual rent registrations.99 These
reports are not public, which might undermine accountability.
Oakland does not maintain any registry of rent-regulated buildings,
posing substantial complications for enforcement efforts.100
Jurisdictions must also determine what penalties to impose for
noncompliance. In 2011, Hoboken residents voted to impose limits
on a system under which tenants could collect retroactive rent

94. L.A., CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 151.28(A)–(B) (2007).
95. Battle Goes on as Rent Control Is Defeated in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 22, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/22/us/battle-goes-on-as-rentcontrol-is-defeated-in-massachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/SS6N-4W9N].
96. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-517 (2019).
97. See, e.g., JERSEY CITY, N.J. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018); Rent
Control, CITY OF NEWARK, N.J., https://www.newarknj.gov/departments/rentcontrol
[https://perma.cc/42L5-4PVF] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019); The Mission of the Rent
Board, CITY & CTY. OF S.F. RENT BD., https://sfrb.org/mission-rent-board
[https://perma.cc/LN7X-L2BS] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
98. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-517 (2019).
99. Id. § 26-517(f).
100. See Bigad Shaban et al., Lack of Oversight May Be Allowing Some Oakland
Landlords to Wrongfully Evict Families, Elderly, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/Lack-of-Oversight-May-be-AllowingSome-Oakland-Landlords-to-Wrongfully-Evict-Families-Elderly-474352123.html
[https://perma.cc/7J44-MLXT] (“Although copies of all eviction notices are kept on
file at Oakland’s Department of Housing and Community Development, city officials
tell the Investigative Unit no one is currently tracking how many owner move-in
evictions occur each year, let alone attempt to determine how many of those evictions
may be fraudulent.”).
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overcharges from landlords.101 Under the old system, tenants who
believed they were being overcharged could petition the Rent
Leveling Board and, if successful, collect all past overcharges.102
Disputes between landlords and tenants commonly arose from a lack
of documentation.103 In 2006, the city began requiring landlords to
file annual forms documenting the legal rents for their units.104 The
2011 vote then limited the scope of the past overcharges tenants could
collect to two years of rent.105
The Office of Rent Administration within the Division of Housing
and Community Renewal (DHCR) oversees New York’s rent
regulation program.106 Based on DHCR findings, treble damages are
available for many violations, including willful overcharges.107
Tenants may also, of their own initiative, apply for rent reductions if
landlords fail to provide services.108
In San Francisco, imposing an unlawful increase is a misdemeanor
punishable by a $1000 mandatory fine and, potentially, up to six
months of jail time, as is unlawfully recovering possession of a
regulated apartment.109 The city grants tenants a private right of
action for injunctive relief and treble damages for both rent
overcharges and harassment.110 The City Attorney can also bring
civil actions against landlords.111 Additionally, nonprofit tenants’
rights organizations may sue for rent overcharges and harassment if
neither the tenant nor the City Attorney has taken the case.112

101. See Heather Haddon, New Jersey’s Rent-Control Laws Fading, WALL ST. J.
(Nov.
12,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204358004577032473909862662
[https://perma.cc/KN37-H6WW].
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See HOBOKEN, N.J., GEN. REG. § 155-4(A)(1) (2011).
105. See Haddon, supra note 101.
106. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION
AND RENT CONTROL 1 (2018), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/factsheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM].
107. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2526.1 (2005).
108. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-514 (2019); FACT SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION
AND RENT CONTROL, supra note 106, at 2. See generally N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. &
CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #14 RENT REDUCTIONS FOR DECREASED SERVICES
(2016),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/12/orafac14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XM9Y-TN7B].
109. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 37.10B(c) (2019); 37.11A(a) (2017).
110. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.11A(a).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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III. FEATURES AND TRADE-OFFS OF RENT REGULATION: SETTING
RENT INCREASES
Establishing permissible rent increases is the core task of rent
regulation. Here, too, jurisdictions must make several decisions.
First, jurisdictions must decide how annual, across-the-board
increases will be determined. Numerous situations may also compel
jurisdictions to allow increases beyond the annual rate. Jurisdictions
may decide, for example, to compensate landlords for the costs of
capital or other improvements through rent increases or instead to
permit larger-than-usual rent increases when units become vacant.
They must also decide whether landlords can “bank” unused
increases and apply them in future years, and how to determine when
a landlord has not received a fair rate of return on the property. This
Part outlines the trade-offs that jurisdictions face at each of these
junctures as well as the diversity of schemes that have arisen in
response.
A. Process of Setting Rent Increases
A set of critical choices surrounds allowable annual rent increases.
The first issue concerns the process. Jurisdictions can opt to use a
pre-determined formula; or create an agency, board or other body; or
charge an existing institution to set increases.113 Using a formula —
for example, setting maximum rent increases by reference to a
specified measure of inflation114 — simplifies the process
considerably, but it may understate or overstate costs if changes in
building operating costs diverge substantially from the index selected.
An agency or board may be able to incorporate more information and
be more nuanced, but that entity may be vulnerable to political or
other pressures.
Even jurisdictions with annual increases fixed by or based on price
indexes must choose which index to peg to and whether to increase or
decrease from the index figure. There is substantial variation in the
indices used to determine allowable annual rent increases. In D.C.,
for example, the Rental Housing Commission has determined that
across-the-board increases to which landlords are entitled for rentregulated units should equal the increase in the consumer price index

113. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-3502.08(h)(2)(A) (1985); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26510 (2006); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.36.020 (1997); MAIN
FEATURES OF RENT STABILIZATION, supra note 6, at 75; Rent Control, supra note 97.
114. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-3502.08(h)(2)(A) (1985) (pegging annual increases
to CPI); Rent Control, supra note 97 (same).
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(CPI) plus 2%.115 In West Hollywood, it is 75% of the CPI for greater
Los Angeles.116 In Jersey City, the annual increase, set by the City
Council, is tied more directly to the increase in the cost of living
during the lease term.117 The annual increase cannot exceed 4% or,
alternatively, the percentage difference between the CPI three
months before the lease expires and three months before the lease
began, whichever is less.118
Many jurisdictions vest the determination of the annual rent
increases in rent boards, which may be elected or appointed by local
or regional authorities.119 In New York State, local Rent Guidelines
Boards determine rates for increases each year.120 New York City’s
Rent Guidelines Board has nine members, all appointed by the
Mayor.121 Two members are appointed to represent tenant interests;
two to represent the interests of property owners; and five to
represent the general public.122 Under the Emergency Tenant
Protection Act of 1974, the Boards outside of New York City have
the same composition, but members are appointed by the
Commissioner of the State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal.123
Rent boards also serve functions other than determining rent
increases. In Newark, price increases are pegged to the consumer
price index and cannot exceed 4%, so the Board does not set the base
annual increase.124 Instead, its central function is to oversee

115. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.08(h)(2)(A) (1985); see also Rent Control CPI for 2019,
OFF.
TENANT
ADVOC.,
https://ota.dc.gov/page/rent-control-cpi-2018
[http://perma.cc/28ZB-AUHN] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) (explaining rent increases
for rent controlled units). The consumer price index, produced by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, measures the average change in the price of a fixed bundle of goods.
Consumer Price Index, U.S. DEP’T LAB., BUREAU LAB. STAT, https://www.bls.gov/cpi/
[https://perma.cc/KGU5-7RSF] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
116. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.36.020 (1997).
117. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-3(A) (2018).
118. Id.
119. Santa Monica serves as an example of an elected rent control board. See Meet
CITY
OF
SANTA
MONICA,
the
Board,
https://www.smgov.net/Departments/Rent_Control/About_the_Rent_Control_Board
/Meet_the_Board.aspx [https://perma.cc/LV7K-RK5B] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
120. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510 (2006).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §
8621 (McKinney 1987).
124. Rent Control, supra note 97.
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administrative hearings and mediation of landlord-tenant disputes
arising under Newark’s rent regulations.125
B. Increases Beyond Annual Rate

i. Vacancy Bonuses
Legislators may want to allow higher rent increases when a tenant
moves out. Proponents argue that such “vacancy bonuses” maintain
protections for existing tenants and prevent landlords from being
locked into low rents when those tenants leave.126 However,
generous vacancy allowances may also undermine the degree to
which rent regulation can keep overall rents low. Furthermore,
vacancy bonuses may encourage landlords to push out existing
tenants, so they can replace them and charge higher rents. As noted
earlier, two recent studies of the San Francisco housing market
provide some evidence for this argument, finding higher rates of
eviction and turnover in regulated units in areas with unusually high
price appreciation.127
Most jurisdictions allow landlords to increase rents beyond the
annual increase when units become vacant,128 but these bonuses vary
substantially. In California, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act
allows landlords to increase rent to the market rate when a new
tenancy begins.129 In some other jurisdictions, landlords can make
more substantial increases upon vacancy than they are otherwise
permitted but the vacancy bonus may not take the unit all the way up
to the market rate. Until June 2019, for instance, in New York City, a
landlord could increase rent by 20% of the legal regulated rent for an
incoming tenant with a two-year lease, or slightly less for a tenant
with a one-year lease; recent reforms eliminated this vacancy

125. Id.
126. See Mireya Navarro, Tenant Advocates Want Rent Increases Tied to a
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
17,
2016),
Vacancy
Stopped,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/nyregion/tenant-advocates-want-rent-increasestied-to-a-vacancy-stopped.html [https://perma.cc/23Bx-G4UH] (“The association said
the vacancy allowance was written into law as a recognition that landlords might need
to ‘catch up’ in rent revenue between tenants to help maintain the building, and as a
way to have a new tenant bear the increase.”).
127. Asquith, supra note 36, at 27–30; Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 16–18.
128. See, e.g., Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.52
(1996) (allowing landlords to increase rents without restriction between tenancies in
all California cities); Vacancy Increase Reform Act of 2018, D.C. CODE § 42-3502.13
(2018).
129. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1954.52–53.
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allowance.130 D.C.’s Vacancy Increase Reform Act of 2018 instead
pegs allowable increases to the duration of the previous tenant’s
occupation of the unit, and permits a landlord to increase the rent by
10% if a previous tenant occupied a unit for fewer than ten years and
20% if the previous tenancy lasted more than ten years.131 This
measure restrained vacancy bonuses that previously went up to
30%.132
Several jurisdictions impose conditions on vacancy bonuses that
primarily concern improvements to the units in question. In early
2017, the Newark City Council reduced the amount that landlords
were obligated to spend rehabilitating vacant apartments to raise
rents by up to 20%.133 Several months later, the vacancy reforms were
essentially reversed and the city’s rent regulation ordinance
tightened.134 The revised ordinance requires landlords to spend an
amount equal to four months’ rent on rehabilitating vacant
apartments before they are eligible for vacancy bonuses of up to 10%,
or eight months’ rent to qualify for a 20% increase.135 Jersey City
similarly conditions a landlord’s entitlement to a vacancy increase by
pegging the increase amount to the amount the landlord has spent on

130. “For an incoming tenant who opts for a one-year lease, the vacancy allowance
is 20% minus the percentage difference between the Rent Guidelines Board’s
(RGB’s) then-current guidelines for a two-year and a one-year lease.” Glossary of
Rent
Regulation
Terms,
NYC
RENT
GUIDELINES
BOARD,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/resources/glossary-of-rent-regulationterms.page [https://perma.cc/R6CL-Y38G] (search for “Vacancy allowance”
definition) (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
131. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.13 (2018).
132. Memorandum from Jeffrey S. DeWitt, Chief Fin. Officer, Gov’t of D.C.,
Office of the Chief Fin. Officer., to Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of D.C.,
Fiscal Impact Statement – Vacancy Increase Reform Amendment Act of 2018 1
(Nov. 7, 2018), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/37181/B22-0025-Fiscal-ImpactStatement1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z46W-737J].
133. Tenants’ advocates decried the reform as “piece by piece deconstruction of
rent control,” while supporters argued that the reform “strengthened protections for
tenants against slumlords and poor maintenance on buildings.” Karen Yi, New Rule
‘Deconstruction of Rent Control’ in Newark, Advocates Say, NJ.COM (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2017/03/newark_rent_control_ordinance.html
[https://perma.cc/M5SQ-NKHY].
134. Karen Yi, Residents Win Rent Control Battle; Landlords Face Steeper
NJ.COM
(Sept.
10,
2017),
Hurdle
to
Raise
Rents,
https://www.nj.com/essex/2017/09/residents_win_rent_control.html
[https://perma.cc/W6VV-SSQT].
135. Id.
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capital improvements, though it does not go as far as Newark has in
setting a requisite spending level.136

ii. Capital Improvement
Another choice is the extent to which systems should compensate
landlords for capital improvements through higher rents. Such
increases help incentivize property maintenance and needed repairs,
but can allow housing to become less affordable.
Capital
improvements may also encourage landlords to make investments
that are not essential or desired by tenants, such as installing granite
countertops. Therefore, providing any kind of capital improvement
allowance should require monitoring and enforcement.
A landlord’s ability to pass the costs of capital improvements in
buildings or individual units along to existing tenants, as well as the
duration of the resulting rent increases and whether they can be
applied retroactively, varies by jurisdiction. Under Los Angeles’s
Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO), landlords may pass on
approximately 50% of the improvement costs to both individual units
and common areas to tenants over time.137 This is done by dividing
50% of the improvement costs over rental payments for a period not
exceeding six years.138 By contrast, until June 2019, New York State’s
rent regulation program allowed owners to recover 100% of their
investments in improvements.139 New York’s rent regulation scheme
distinguishes Major Capital Improvements (MCIs), covering building-

136. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-5 (2018); NEWARK, N.J.,
ORDINANCE § 19:2-7.1 (2017).
137. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 151.07(A)(1)(a) (1989) (“the landlord shall only be
entitled to a temporary monthly rent increase of 1/60th of fifty percent (50%) of the
average per unit capital improvement cost”). The Rent Stabilization Ordinance
defines a capital improvement as:
The addition or replacement of the following improvements to a rental unit
or common areas of the housing complex containing the rental unit,
providing such new improvement has a useful life of five (5) years or more:
roofing, carpeting, draperies, stuccoing the outside of a building, air
conditioning, security gates, swimming pool, sauna or hot tub, fencing,
garbage disposal, washing machine or clothes dryer, dishwasher, children’s
play equipment permanently installed on the premises, the complete
exterior painting of a building, and other similar improvements as
determined by the Commission.
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 151.02 (1989).
138. L.A., CAL. MUN. CODE § 151.07(A)(1)(a).
139. See Kevin Sun, Analysis: Here’s What the New Rent Law Will Do to the
REAL
DEAL
(June
18,
2019),
Average
Stabilized
Apartment,
https://therealdeal.com/2019/06/18/analysis-heres-what-the-new-rent-law-will-do-tothe-average-stabilized-apartment/ [https://perma.cc/Z4QU-X6YN].
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wide improvements — such as new windows, boilers, or roofs140 —
and Individual Apartment Improvements (IAIs), covering upgrades
to individual apartments, such as installing a new dishwasher.141
The Office of Rent Administration in the New York State’s
Division of Housing and Community Renewal must approve any
requested rent increases based on MCIs.142 IAIs do not require
DHCR approval and landlords are only required to provide
“detailed” cost explanations.143 Rent increases based on MCIs are
calculated by amortizing the approved costs of the improvements
over 12.5 years for buildings with more than 35 units and over 12
years for buildings with 6 to 35 units, subject to a 2% cap on annual
rent increases.144 Until June 2019, the cap was 6%.145 These increases
of 1/108th or 1/96th of the approved costs of the MCI, respectively,
become parts of the legal base rent for 30 years.146 The cost is divided
by the total number of rooms in the building to arrive at a per-room,
per-month increase applied to the tenant’s rent.147 MCIs cover only
new installations and complete replacements, not repairs of old
equipment.148
Pursuant to New York’s recent reforms,149 the owner of a building
with more than 35 units can collect a permanent monthly rent
increase equal to 1/180th of the cost of an IAI. For owners of

140. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 2522.4(a)(2)(i) (2019).
141. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT
INCREASES FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (2018)
[hereinafter
FACT
SHEET
#26
(2018)],
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orafac26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DWT2-MV2A].
142. An owner may file an application to increase the legal regulated rents of the
building or building complex on forms prescribed by the DHCR. N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(a)(1) (2019).
143. See S.B. S6548, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). For previous system, see
FACT SHEET #26 (2018), supra note 141, at 6.
144. See FACT SHEET #26 (2018), supra note 141, at 3.
145. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #24 MAJOR CAPITAL
IMPROVEMENTS
3
(2014),
https://www.msnhlaw.com/docs/fact_sheet_24_20140416125002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CGC2-QSNZ].
146. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT
INCREASES
FOR
RENT
STABILIZED
APARTMENTS
3
(2019),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/09/FACT 20SHEET 2026.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TUM9-9UW5].
147. Id.
148. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 2522.4 (2019).
149. See S.B. 6458, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
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buildings with 35 or fewer units, the increase is 1/168th.150 Increases
based on IAIs were uncapped until June 2019 and are now capped at
$15,000.151 Landlords must provide current tenants with explanations
of costs related to IAIs, but the process requires only that landlords
self-certify these expenses with DHCR. Landlords are not required
to seek approval from new tenants for IAIs made during vacancy.152
Before June 2019, capital improvement increases taking place upon
vacancy were added to the legal rent after vacancy bonuses were
calculated.153
San Francisco permits landlords of buildings with five or fewer
units to pass the full costs of capital improvements on to sitting and
future tenants that have benefited from the improvements.154 This is
subject to a 5% annual cap on any increase in base rent.155 Landlords
of buildings with more than five units can only pass 50% of their costs,
subject to a 10% annual cap on base rents.156 D.C. sets higher limits,
permitting increases of up to 20% for building-wide improvements
and up to 15% for other improvements.157

ii. Rents Below the Legal Maximum
Additional questions arise when a landlord charges a tenant a rent
below the legal maximum or, in some jurisdictions, when a landlord
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also Justin R. La Mort, The Theft of Affordable Housing: How Rent-

Stabilized Apartments Are Disappearing from Fraudulent Individual Apartment
Improvements and What Can be Done to Save Them, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.

CHANGE 351, 369–70 (2016) (arguing that IAIs should follow MCIs and be subject to
a 6% cap).
152. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, OPERATIONAL BULLETIN 2016-1
(REVISED):
INDIVIDUAL
APARTMENT
IMPROVEMENTS
1
(2017),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orao20161.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BS6E-ETKR] (outlining certification process).
153. See FACT SHEET #26 (2018), supra note 141, at 5.
154. Supervisor Ammiano Introduces Capital Improvement Passthrough
Compromise Ord. 050702, CITY & CTY. OF S.F., https://sfrb.org/supervisor-ammianointroduces-capital-improvement-passthrough-compromise-ord-050702
[https://perma.cc/G6J8-LK6S] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
155. Id.
156. Two exceptions are seismic work required by law and energy conservation
work, for which landlords may pass 100% of their costs through to tenants. See Fact
Sheet 5 - Landlord Petitions and Passthroughs, CITY & CTY. OF S.F. (Apr. 2010),
https://sfrb.org/fact-sheet-5-landlord-petitions-and-passthroughs
[https://perma.cc/MAP4-FKRP]. In addition, “a majority of the tenants in any unit
may elect an alternative passthrough method based on 100% of the certified capital
improvements costs, to be imposed at the rate of 5% of the tenant’s base rent per
year, with the total passthrough limited to 15% of the tenant’s base rent.” Id.
157. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.10 (1985).
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declines to increase a tenant’s rent by the maximum allowable
increase.158 A landlord might do this because the market will not
support the legal maximum rent or to keep desirable tenants in their
buildings. While policymakers should not discourage landlords from
setting rents that are lower than the allowable rents, allowing them to
bank increases creates the risk that landlords will impose banked rent
increases suddenly, burdening tenants with large and unexpected rent
increases.159 Some rent regulation proponents worry that landlords
game these banked rents by charging “teaser” rents to attract tenants,
then increasing rents sharply in order to get rid of tenants they do not
like, or taking advantage of increases allowed upon vacancy.160
Jurisdictions have taken different approaches to rent banking.
Until recently, in New York City, a landlord charging a “preferential”
rent — anything lower than the legal maximum, or the base rent plus
all allowable increases — was able to revoke the preferential rent and
begin charging the higher, legal regulated rent upon either lease
renewal or vacancy.161 They were, however, required to provide
tenants with written notice of the legal regulated rent in both the
original and renewal leases.162 Furthermore, landlords and tenants

158. See, e.g., CITY OF WEST HOLLYWOOD RENT STABILIZATION & HOUS. DIV.,
GUIDE:
RENT
STABILIZATION
8
(Nov.
2018),
https://www.weho.org/home/showdocument?id=15066
[https://perma.cc/M3MWQRQV]; N.Y. DIV. HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #40 PREFERENTIAL
RENTS
1
(2019),
http://www.nyshcr.org/Rent/FactSheets/orafac40.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W35M-335E]; Fact Sheet 7 - Annual Allowable Rent Increases and
Banked Rent Increases, CITY & CTY. OF S.F. (2010), https://sfrb.org/fact-sheet-7annual-allowable-rent-increases-and-banked-rent-increases [https://perma.cc/CV5GJS7W].
159. Cezary Podkul, New York Landlords Exploit Loophole to Hike Rents
PROPUBLICA
(Apr.
25,
2017),
Despite
Freeze,
https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-landlords-exploit-loophole-to-hikerents-despite-freeze [https://perma.cc/HSP9-AJWB].
160. See, e.g., id.; Amy Plitt, How New York’s Preferential Rent Loophole Is
Unfairly Used Against Tenants, CURBED N.Y. (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/4/25/15425058/nyc-rent-stabilization-loophole-landlords
[https://perma.cc/XK3S-F6E4]; Steven Wishnia, ‘Preferential Rent’: How Landlords
Kill NYC’s Affordable Apartments and Get Away With It, VILLAGE VOICE (July 6,
2017), https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/07/06/preferential-rent-how-landlords-killnycs-affordable-apartments-and-get-away-with-it/
[https://perma.cc/H8UB-QZLJ];
Preferential
Rents,
METRO.
COUNCIL
ON
HOUSING,
http://metcouncilonhousing.org/help_and_answers/preferential_rents
[https://perma.cc/E7MC-SEJE] (last visited July 25, 2019).
161. FACT SHEET #40, supra note 158.
162. Id.
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were able to contract to apply a preferential rent for the duration of a
tenancy.163
In D.C., a similar system prevailed until 2018. D.C. Attorney
General Karl Racine challenged the practice of basing rent increases
on legal maximum rents, rather than the preferential rents tenants
actually pay, as a deceptive business practice.164 In 2018, the D.C.
Housing Commission ruled in favor of the Attorney General.165 The
Rent Charged Definition Clarification Amendment Act of 2018
codified this decision, requiring landlords to base rent increases on
the amount a tenant actually pays rather than the legal maximum
rent.166 And in June 2019, the New York state legislature changed its
system and became more like D.C.’s, making preferential rents the
new base rents for increases during the term of a tenancy.167
San Francisco allows landlords to apply banked rent increases to
future years,168 while West Hollywood169 and Los Angeles explicitly
prohibit this practice.170 East Palo Alto prohibited banking after a
163. Id.
164. See Complaint at 3–4, District of Columbia v. Equity Residential Mgmt., 2018
D.C. Super. LEXIS 3 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2018) (Case No. 2017 CA 008334 B); Press
Release, Office of Att’y Gen. for D.C., Attorney General Racine Files Suit Against
Landlord for Circumventing District’s Rent Control Laws (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://oag.dc.gov/release/attorney-general-racine-files-suit-against
[https://perma.cc/AS4K-T8AT].
165. Jon Steingart, The DC Council Will Likely Pass Legislation to Fight Sharp
Price Increases for Tenants, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://ggwash.org/view/69920/the-dc-council-will-likely-pass-rent-concessionlegislation-intended-to-end-sharp-price-increases-for-tenants
[https://perma.cc/DK9W-K4HG].
166. See id.; Jon Steingart, Legislation Intended to End Sharp Rent Increases
Lands in the DC Council, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://ggwash.org/view/69358/legislation-intended-to-end-sharp-rent-increases-landsin-the-dc-council [https://perma.cc/8DWV-EU9R]; Jon Steingart, A Lawsuit Alleging

a DC Landlord Uses Discounts to Circumvent Rent Control May Have Gotten a
Boost,
GREATER
GREATER
WASH.
(Mar.
26,
2018),

https://ggwash.org/view/66994/lawsuit-going-after-dc-landlords-offering-rentconcessions-gets-boost [https://perma.cc/PN9A-DQXY].
167. S.B. 6458, 2019 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2019) (“Any tenant who is subject to a
lease on or after the effective date of a chapter of the laws of two thousand nineteen
which amended this paragraph, or is or was entitled to receive a renewal or vacancy
lease on or after such date, upon renewal of such lease, the amount of rent for such
housing accommodation that may be charged and paid shall be no more than the rent
charged to and paid by the tenant prior to that renewal.”).
168. Fact Sheet 7, supra note 158.
169. GUIDE: RENT STABILIZATION, supra note 158, at 8.
170. Nicolas Traylor, “Banking” Annual General Adjustment Rent Increases:
Policy Considerations, CITY OF RICHMOND RENT PROGRAM 30 (Aug. 19, 2017),
https://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/43859/Item-H-2Presentation_8_23_17?bidId= [https://perma.cc/L3PS-FGR3].
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large housing provider increased its rents by 40% after several years
of foregoing rent increases but subsequently moved to a system
allowing banking subject to a 10% annual cap on rent increases.171
Richmond, California similarly allows landlords to bank rent
increases, but subjects increases to a 5% annual cap.172
B. Hardship Increases
Rent regulation systems generally allow a landlord to apply for a
hardship variance if the annual increases provided do not allow the
landlord to receive a fair income after operating expenses. Permitting
hardship increases thus allows jurisdictions to avoid Fifth
Amendment takings claims that would arise from depriving landlords
of fair rates of return.173
171. The prohibition, however, made administering the program more difficult
because many more landlords filed for rent increases every year (knowing they would
otherwise lose the opportunity to take them), and it became more cumbersome to
calculate permissible rent levels and track the maximum legal rent for each tenancy.
The city subsequently eased the prohibition, allowing banking subject to a 10%
annual cap on rent increases. The Los Angeles Rent Board, by contrast, decided in
2009 to prohibit banking, citing fidelity to the goal of protecting against sudden rent
increases. The Board also noted that it used a simpler rent registration system —
tracking rents only at the unit level, rather than for each new tenancy — than East
Palo Alto that was unlikely to be similarly burdened by a banking prohibition. See
Memorandum from Nicolas Traylor, Exec. Dir., City of Richmond Rent Program, to
Chair Gray & Members of Rent Bd., Report on Banking of Annual General
Adjustments
and
Draft
Regulation
10
(Aug.
23,
2017),
https://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/43834/8_23_17-Item-H2?bidId= [https://perma.cc/38YJ-TX5R]; Memorandum from Nicolas Traylor, Exec.
Dir., City of Richmond Rent Program, to Chair Gray & Members of Rent Bd.,
Proposed Revisions to Regulation 602, Regarding “Banking” of Annual General
Adjustment
Rent
Increases
(Nov.
14,
2018),
https://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/47907/COMPILED-ITEM-I1_11-14-18 [https://perma.cc/N2F5-L3B7]; Traylor, supra note 170, at 32.
172. The Board considered the arguments against banking, observing that, in
California, “most landlords are able to receive large rent increases through vacancy
decontrol” over the long run, and suggested that a landlord who declines to take an
annual increase is likely already receiving a fair rate of return for that year, negating
the need to allow the landlord to take the increase later. Nevertheless, Richmond
ultimately adopted banking, citing the likelihood that landlords will choose to raise
rents every year if they know they will forfeit increases otherwise as well as the
potential administrative costs of prohibiting banking. Memorandum from Nicholas
Traylor (Nov. 14, 2018), supra note 171, at 2–3.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of . . . property, without due process of law.”); id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 149 (1978) (“[T]he inability of the owner to make a
reasonable return on his property requires compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.”).
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Jurisdictions estimate the rate of return a landlord derives on a
given property by examining the income the landlord receives from
that property after approved operating expenses relative to the
property’s valuation.174 The range of what rent boards consider a fair
return varies. In D.C., it is 12%, while under a similar formula, New
York considers 8.5% a fair return.175 New York also allows landlords
to claim an alternative form of hardship if their total annual gross
income exceeds their total annual operating expenses by less than
5%.176 The Jersey City Rent Board considers whether a landlord will
be unable to make mortgage payments without a hardship increase.177
Other jurisdictions use formulas in place of fixed rates,178 which may
offer more nuances but can make it more difficult for landlords and
tenants to understand the hardship increase to which a landlord may
be entitled. Both the Newark and Hoboken Rent Boards will deny
hardship increases if a landlord purchased a building for an inflated

174. Under New York’s rent control laws (which are stricter and cover a smaller
share of the housing stock than rent stabilization), for example, a “fair return”
requires a “net annual return” (income minus operating expenses) of 7.5% of the
valuation of the property for owners outside of New York City and 8.5% for owners
inside New York City, measured as the current valuation “properly adjusted by
applying thereto the ratio which such assessed valuation bears to the full valuation as
determined by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment on the basis of the
assessment rolls of cities, towns and villages for the year 1954.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 9, § 2102.3(f)(5) (2019).
175. See D.C. CODE § 42-3502.12 (1985); S.B. 6458, 2019 Sen., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2019); see also Glossary of Rent Regulation Terms, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/resources/glossary-of-rent-regulationterms.page#hardship [https://perma.cc/CY7R-QE7E] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
176. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING AN
OWNER’S APPLICATION FOR RENT INCREASE BASED ON ALTERNATIVE HARDSHIP 3
(1995),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/10/formrtp45iinstructionsrentincrease
alternativehardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF79-3Y6S]; see also Glossary of Rent
Regulation Terms, supra note 175.
177. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-10(a) (amended by Ordinance
No. 19-044 2019).
178. See, e.g., FAIR LAWN, N.J. BOROUGH CODE § 177-11(A)(4) (1984) (“If the
most recent year’s percentage of net operating expenses to total gross income
exceeds the average of the prior applicable years and the most recent year’s
percentage of net operating expenses to total gross income exceeds 60%, the
applicant shall receive a hardship rent increase sufficient to restore the percentage of
net operating expenses to total gross income of the most recent year to the average of
the prior applicable years.”); id. § 177-11(C) (“The formula for figuring the hardship
increase, if the Board has determined there is a hardship, is as follows: Net operating
expense (4th year)/three-year average (as a decimal) = New rental to cure
hardship.”).
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price and thus could not reasonably have expected to receive a fair
return on that investment.179
Some jurisdictions condition hardship increases upon a showing
that landlords comply with health and safety obligations.180 In Jersey
City, a landlord must produce an inspection report showing that the
building is in “substantial compliance” with applicable building codes
— or submit to inspection within six months — to be eligible for a
hardship increase.181 These processes are one way to ensure a
balance between landlords’ entitlements to fair returns and their
obligations to provide habitable dwellings. But landlords whose
buildings are losing money may lack the available cash to make
necessary repairs, further compounding their difficulties. Hardship
increases may also allow jurisdictions more flexibility in responding to
the risk that across-the-board increases will leave some landlords with
too little revenue. If the standards for challenges are lax, such
challenges will add administrative costs as staff is forced to assess the
merits of a large number of individual claims. And of course, overly
generous waivers will ultimately undermine the affordability
protections provided.
IV. FEATURES AND TRADE-OFFS OF RENT REGULATION:
ADDITIONAL TENANT PROTECTIONS
Rent regulation schemes are often coupled with protections for
tenants.182 Many schemes grant tenants in regulated units special
protections against eviction and harassment, which owners of
regulated units might be more likely to practice because of the value
of creating a vacancy in these units. Such protections may also ensure
extra security for particularly vulnerable populations.
The trade-off here is clear. Additional rights, such as just cause
eviction rules or expanded access to counsel in housing court
proceedings, can protect tenants from being harassed to leave their
units and help prevent arbitrary or unexplained evictions.183
179. See HOBOKEN, N.J., GEN. REGS., Art. II § 155-14 (1984) (“It is not the
intention of this chapter to permit a hardship rental increase when the landlord has
not made a reasonably prudent investment.”).
180. See, e.g., JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE IX § 13.76; OAKLAND, CAL., MUN.
CODE § 8.22.360; S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE § 37.9.
183. See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME (2009); Margaret Jane
Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 372 (1986); Kenneth
Salzberg & Audrey A. Zibelman, Good Cause Eviction, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 61,
62–63 (1985). See generally Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to
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However, they can also increase landlords’ costs of removing tenants
when warranted, ultimately raising the cost for all tenants and
discouraging investment in rental properties.184 Further, they can
cause landlords to conduct additional screening to minimize the risk
of problematic tenants.185
A. Protections Against Eviction and Harassment
Rent regulation provisions designed to protect tenants from unjust
evictions or landlord misconduct may take the form of just cause
eviction statutes and other anti-harassment or anti-displacement
protections. Rent regulation programs may also require landlords to
pay relocation expenses for tenants under some circumstances.186
Just cause statutes limit the bases on which landlords may evict
tenants to statutorily-specified grounds.187 For example, in D.C.,
Oakland, San Francisco, and throughout New Jersey,188 where just
cause eviction protections exist, acceptable causes for eviction include
nonpayment of rent, violation of a lease obligation, sale or conversion
of the unit, or discontinued housing use, among others.189
Some jurisdictions provide eviction protections to all tenants,190
while others, like New York City and San Francisco, provide them

Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 557 (1988).
184. See, e.g., W. DENNIS KEATING, RENT CONTROL 50 (1998) (discussing higher
rent in return for security from eviction, so that long stay tenants benefit in time);
Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protections and the Takings Clause, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 925, 959–60 (1993); J.R. Miron, Security of Tenure, Costly Tenants and Rent
Regulation, 27 URB. STUD. 167, 168 (1990); Diamond, Economic Evidence, supra
note 66, at 2.
185. Landlords screening due to difficulty of eviction is discussed in David P. Sims,

Rent Control Rationing and Community Composition: Evidence from
Massachusetts, 11 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 6, 24 (2011); see also Meredith
Greif, Regulating Landlords: Unintended Consequences for Poor Tenants, 17 CITY &

COMMUNITY 658, 666–67 (2018).
186. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.360 (2003); S.F., CAL.,
ORDINANCE § 37.9 (2017).
187. “Just Cause” Eviction Policies, LOCAL HOUSING SOLUTIONS 1,
https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/act/housing-policy-library/just-cause-evictionpolicies-overview/just-cause-eviction-policies/?pdf=2067
[https://perma.cc/K45K5GTV] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
188. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-53–84 (2008).
189. NYU FURMAN CTR., GENTRIFICATION RESPONSE: A SURVEY OF STRATEGIES
TO
MAINTAIN
NEIGHBORHOOD
ECONOMIC
DIVERSITY
17
(2016),
http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_GentrificationResponse_26OCT20
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3E6-2SPA].
190. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE IX § 13.76 (2018); OAKLAND, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 8.22.360 (“No landlord shall endeavor to recover possession, issue a
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only to tenants in rent-regulated units.191 At the universalist end of
the spectrum, D.C. extends just cause eviction protections to all
units;192 Seattle’s just cause ordinance expressly extends this
protection even to month-to-month and verbal lease agreements;193
and Oregon voters elected to impose just-cause eviction protections
statewide.194
Berkeley and Oakland also extend just cause protections to all
units.195 A key limitation on these protections concerning rent
regulated units in California, however, is the potential for eviction
under the statewide Ellis Act.196 The Ellis Act allows an owner of a
rent-regulated building to evict tenants in order to remove the
building from the rental market.197
Landlords seeking to evict tenants may also be required to pay
relocation expenses to minimize the costs and disruptive effects of
moving for tenants. In 2018, the Oakland City Council passed the
Uniform Relocation Ordinance, which increased the relocation
payments landlords are required to pay tenants in rent-regulated units
in all no-fault evictions and pegged these payments to the CPI.198 The
Ordinance also expanded the relocation payment requirement to
apply to owners seeking to evict tenants in order to move back into

notice terminating tenancy, or recover possession of a rental unit in the city of
Oakland unless the landlord is able to prove the existence of one of the following
grounds.”).
191. See S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE § 37.9.
192. D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2019).
193. Just Cause Eviction Ordinance, SEATTLE DEP’T CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS,
http://www.seattle.gov/sdci/codes/codes-we-enforce-(a-z)/just-cause-evictionordinance [https://perma.cc/5L9M-XVMC] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
194. Sasha Ingber, Oregon Set to Pass the First Statewide Rent Control Bill, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/698509957/oregon-setto-pass-the-first-statewide-rent-control-bill [https://perma.cc/9RAF-D4BR].
195. BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE IX § 13.76.030 (2018); OAKLAND, CAL., MUN.
CODE 8.22.360 (2019) (“No landlord shall endeavor to recover possession, issue a
notice terminating tenancy, or recover possession of a rental unit in the city of
Oakland unless the landlord is able to prove the existence of one of the following
grounds.”).
196. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12.75 (2000).
197. Id.
198. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 13468 (2017); Ali Tadayon, Oakland
Landlords Will Have to Pay Thousands if They Evict Tenants to Move Back In,
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/01/24/oaklandlandlords-will-have-to-pay-thousands-if-they-evict-tenants-to-move-back-in/
[https://perma.cc/842B-453K].

2019]

LABORATORIES OF REGULATION

1073

their units.199 Los Angeles and San Francisco also require landlords
to pay relocation expenses for evictions for which there is no just
cause; New York City does not.200
Harassment aimed at pushing tenants to vacate their units is a risk
when market conditions and vacancy bonuses allow regulated
landlords to collect higher rents through turnover. A series of
legislative efforts in 2017 expanded harassment protections for
tenants in New York City.201 Laws prohibit landlords from harassing
tenants by way of threats, intimidation, or tactics such as disrupting
services or failing to complete repairs.202 These expansions also
limited the circumstances under which landlords can communicate
with tenants about buyouts.203
Causes of action and remedies vary across jurisdictions. New York
City tenants can initiate harassment cases in housing court and can
potentially receive civil penalties and/or compensatory damages,
attorneys’ fees and/or punitive damages.204 San Francisco’s tenant
harassment law generally offers the same protections as New York
City’s, but it does not similarly limit landlords’ abilities to contact
tenants about buyouts.205 In San Francisco, a tenant who successfully
sues for harassment can collect the greater of treble damages or $1000
for each offense under local law,206 and $2000 in statutory damages
for each threat of harassment under state law.207 In harassment cases,
both the Rent Board and the City Attorney can pursue civil litigation
against landlords for civil penalties and injunctive relief or to refer
cases to the District Attorney.208
New York City also designates “anti-harassment zones,”209 in
which an owner seeking a permit for construction or renovation must

199. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 8.22.850, 8.22.300–.390; Barbara J. Parker,

Frequently Asked Questions, IV.1., OFF. CITY ATT’Y (Mar. 6, 2018), https://cao-

94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/OAK071011.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3B2-9AJZ].
200. L.A., CAL. MUN. CODE § 151.30 (2007); S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 37.9C
(2017).
201. Protecting Tenants, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.gov/reports/speakers2017-annual-report/protecting-tenants/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2019).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115(o) (2017).
205. See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.10B (2017).
206. Id. § 37.10B(c).
207. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.2(b) (2018).
208. Any person, including the City, may enforce the provisions of this Section by
means of a civil action. Id. § 37.11A (2017).
209. Certification of No Harassment, N.Y.C. DEP’T HOUSING PRESERVATION &
DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/owners/certification-of-no-harassment.page
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first obtain a “certification of no harassment,” or a waiver, by
submitting documentation about the owners or members of a
corporate entity, and any rental history to the city’s Department of
Housing Preservation and Development.210 The city then commences
a period of notice, outreach, and investigation into any past
harassment, including soliciting feedback from tenants and
community groups.211 If the investigation reveals allegations of
harassment, an administrative body reviews the case to determine
whether the agency can refuse to grant a certificate.212
In Oakland, enforcement power is vested in the City Attorney to
pursue actions against landlords displaying a pattern or practice of
harassment, rather than relying on individual tenants to raise these
claims.213 This system provides the advantage of lowering the burden
on tenants and also makes it easier for the City Attorney to identify
patterns of harassment.214 East Palo Alto and West Hollywood have
protection against harassment, but do not provide for treble damages
or attorneys’ fees.215
B. Special Provisions for Particular Tenants
Even if policymakers choose not to provide additional protections
to all rent regulated tenants, they may decide to offer them to
vulnerable groups, such as seniors, people with disabilities, or lowincome households with children. Often these protections involve
subsidies that cover rent increases for such tenants, essentially
limiting the tenants’ contributions to rent.216 The argument for such
protections is that these vulnerable populations are often on fixed
incomes and have limited or no ability to increase earnings in order to
handle higher rents. Furthermore, these subsidies can shift the cost of

[https://perma.cc/G5T5-SMMA] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). The Certification of No
Harassment requirements apply to five geographic areas and to all single room
occupancy multiple dwellings (SROs). Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See GENTRIFICATION RESPONSE, supra note 189, at 19.
213. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.150(c) (2019).
214. See id.
215. Tenant Harassment Prohibition, CITY OF WEST HOLLYWOOD,
https://www.weho.org/city-government/rent-stabilization-housing/rentstabilization/tenant-faqs/tenant-harassment-prohibition
[https://perma.cc/CB9DSURR] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019); EAST PALO ALTO, CAL., ORDINANCE §§ 14.02.100,
14.02.170(B) (2019).
216. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24 (1985); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-509
(repealed 2019).
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alleviating rent burdens from landlords to the government. However,
these subsidies involve taxpayer dollars and can be costly to
administer and enforce. Policymakers should also consider the
potential risk of moral hazard if it is possible for tenants to change
their reported income, household composition, or some other
malleable attribute in order to qualify for benefits. Landlords may
also be subject to moral hazard, raising rents on tenants beyond what
they would otherwise have asked, because the government, not the
tenant, is paying for the increase.
Many jurisdictions provide no such protections, although they may
provide these groups with benefits outside of rent regulation
programs. Both New York and D.C. extend additional protections
from rent increases to tenants of rent-regulated apartments who are
elderly or have disabilities.217 In both cities, tenants must register in
order to receive these subsidies.218 New York City’s Senior Citizen
Rent Increase Exemption (SCRIE) and the Disabled Rent Increase
Exemption (DRIE)219 freeze rents at their current level for tenants
with combined household incomes of $50,000 or less who pay onethird or more of their monthly household income in rent.220 Going
forward, a property tax credit to the landlord will cover the difference
between the legal rent and the frozen rate the tenant pays.221 Tenants
are responsible for applying to the program and periodically
reestablishing their eligibility.222 Public awareness and uptake have
been low since the program’s inception,223 prompting the city to

217. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-509 (repealed 2019).
218. See Freeze Your Rent: A Guide for Tenants, N.Y.C. DEP’T FIN. 1, 9–10 (Nov.
1,
2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/pdf/brochures/scriedriebrochure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SEX-ZTKH]; Elderly and Disability Tenant Rent Control
D.C.
OFFICE
OF
THE
TENANT
ADVOCATE,
Registration
Clinic,
https://ota.dc.gov/page/elderly-and-disability-tenant-rent-control-registration-clinic
[https://perma.cc/M8HQ-HUFQ] (last visited July 20, 2019).
219. Rent Freeze for People with Disabilities: Disability Rent Increase Exemption
(DRIE) Program, N.Y.C. DEP’T FIN. & N.Y.C. HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEV.,
https://access.nyc.gov/programs/disability-rent-increase-exemption-drie/
[https://perma.cc/E2WU-ZZNV] (last visited July 18, 2019).
220. Freeze Your Rent, supra note 218, at 2.
221. Id. at 14.
222. Id. at 15.
223. See Erica Byfield, NYC Program Helps Seniors Freeze Their Rent, But ‘Tens
of Thousands’ Don’t Know About It, NBC N.Y. (July 14, 2017, 10:32 PM),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NYC-Program-Helps-Seniors-Freeze-TheirRent-But-Many-Dont-Know-About-It-Thousands-Dont-Know-About-This-NYCRent-Freezing-Program-434590073.html [https://perma.cc/E8F6-33ZE]. New York
City Councilmember Helen Rosenthal’s office has been trying to raise awareness of
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engage in public outreach to make potential applicants aware of their
eligibility.224 In D.C., the Elderly Tenant and Tenant With a
Disability Protection Amendment Act of 2016 caps annual rent
increases for eligible tenants at the lowest of the Social Security Costof-Living Adjustment, the CPI, or 5% of the rent the tenant currently
pays.225
New York’s SCRIE and DRIE programs fix rents at lower levels
while keeping the amount of rent the landlord receives the same.226
As a result, these programs are also relatively costly to the city
government, which makes up the difference between the frozen rent
and the legal maximum rent.227 Under D.C.’s scheme, landlords must
absorb the difference between the 5% cap on rent increases for
tenants who are elderly or have disabilities and 10% cap for all other
tenants.228 But landlords receive property tax credits for the costs of
capital improvements to properties housing elderly or disabled
tenants.229 Thus both systems contain at least some provisions to
encourage landlords to continue to accept elderly and disabled
tenants even though they may pay lower out-of-pocket rents.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In a policymaker’s ideal world, research would show the effect of
each of the various decisions that have to be made in designing a rent
regulation program. Presently, however, there is little rigorous

SCRIE and locate more seniors to apply. Id. So far, they have signed up about 1400
people. Id. “Reimbursement is not the issue. Money from the city isn’t the issue,”
Rosenthal said. “The issue is tens of thousands of people qualify for the program but
don’t know about it.” Id. A similar rent freeze program, DRIE, is targeted toward
people with disabilities. Both programs require residents to reapply each year to
ensure they don’t earn more than $50,000 per year. Id.; Mireya Navarro, Albany
Expands Effort to Cap Regulated Rents for Older Tenants, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/nyregion/albany-expands-effort-to-capregulated-rents-for-older-tenants.html [https://perma.cc/75VX-YUG6].
224. Sarina Trangle, City Goes Door-To-Door in Effort to Enroll More Senior
N.Y.
(July
9,
2017),
Citizens
in
Rent
Freeze
Program, AM
https://www.amny.com/real-estate/city-goes-door-to-door-in-effort-to-enroll-moresenior-citizens-in-rent-freeze-program-1.13790667
[https://perma.cc/2CF8-BUPE]
(“At that time, the city estimated that 69,000 eligible households were not benefitting
from SCRIE and nearly 25,000 qualified families were not receiving DRIE.”).
225. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24 (1985).
226. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-509 (repealed 2019).
227. Id.
228. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24.
229. Id.
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research about modern-day rent regulation programs 230 and even
less about which particular features drive the effects rent regulation
may have upon the housing market. Without changes in policies that
allow researchers to isolate the effects of various features, it will be
difficult to specify what kinds of reforms might lead to more effective
and efficient policies. But some jurisdictions are considering changes
in particular elements of their rent regulation programs,231 and
research should follow those reforms carefully. Further, this Article
focused on programs in the United States, but it would also be helpful
to survey the design of programs around the world and better
understand what research shows about those programs and how those
lessons might apply in the United States.
Jurisdictions considering new rent regulation programs, as well as
those thinking about how to reform existing systems, should think
carefully about the range of options available. These jurisdictions
should talk with people familiar with various jurisdictions’ programs
to learn more about the implications and unintended consequences of
various design elements. Jurisdictions also should consider how their
rental markets are changing and whether their rent regulation
programs are keeping up. As more single-family homes are rented,
for example, and more of those are owned by companies that manage
230. Of the reviewed studies, most use data from the 1990s. See Autor et al., supra
note 17, at 32; Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 6; Gilderbloom & Yee, supra note 15,
at 219. Only the few studies which consider changes in regulations in San Francisco
and Massachusetts use data up to 2000, one study goes up to 2005; only Asquith,
supra note 36, uses data solely from after 2000.
231. For examples of proposed legislation currently under consideration in state
legislatures, see, for example, A.B. 1482, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019)
(amending Costa-Hawkins Act to allow rent stabilization for certain single-family
homes); A.B. 1110, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (extending notice period
required for month-to-month leases based on amount of proposed rent increase);
A.B. 724, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (creating online rental registry); S.B.
19-225, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); H.B. 0255, 101st Gen.
Assemb. (Ill. 2019) (repealing statewide ban on rent regulation); H.B. 2192, 101st
Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019) (establishing statewide rent regulation program); H.B. 1316,
191st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019) (allowing jurisdictions to impose local
limits on rent increases); S.B. 5040, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (allowing additional New
York State jurisdictions to enact rent regulation laws); S.B. 2591A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2019) (amending rent stabilization high-rent deregulation provisions); S.B. 2845, Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (prohibiting landlords from revoking preferential rents upon lease
termination); S.B. 185, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (eliminating 20& vacancy bonus for
rent stabilized units); N.Y. S.B. 3693/A.B. 6322 (N.Y. 2019) (eliminating permanent
increases for major capital improvements); S.B. 3770, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019)
(repealing provisions of rent stabilization law relating to individual apartment
improvement increase); S.B. 299A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (limiting scope of fuel
pass-along charges for rent-stabilized units); S.B. 5600, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2019) (increasing notice period for termination of residential leases).
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hundreds or thousands of units, the exemption for single-family
rentals may no longer be warranted in some cities.232 Similarly, as
more tenants use home-sharing platforms to sublet their units for
short-term visitors,233 the interaction of rent regulation and homesharing regulations may require attention. More jurisdictions are
funding legal assistance for renters facing eviction, and that change
may require rethinking some aspects of rent regulation programs.234
Given the crisis in housing affordability that almost every major
metropolitan area faces,235 the pressure to regulate rents will likely
increase in the coming years. Further, residents are likely to call for
rent regulation to counter their concerns about the effects new
investments in neighborhoods may have in increasing rents or
prompting displacement.236 Policymakers and researchers should

232. See CAROLINA K. REID ET AL., TERNER CTR., THE RISE OF SINGLE-FAMILY
RENTALS AFTER THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS: UNDERSTANDING TENANT PERSPECTIVES
1–2,
16
(2018)
http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/SingleFamily_Renters_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC2K-NYSD]. See generally James
Mills et al., Large-Scale Buy-to-Rent Investors in the Single-Family Housing Market:
The Emergence of a New Asset Class, 47 REAL ESTATE ECON. 399 (2019) (exploring
potential factors behind the rise of investor-owned single-family rental housing).
233. See generally DAVID WACHSMUTH ET AL., URB. POLITICS & GOVERNANCE
RESEARCH GRP., MCGILL UNIV. SCH. OF URBAN PLANNING, THE HIGH COST OF
SHORT-TERM RENTALS IN NEW YORK CITY (2018); Alastair Boone, What Airbnb
Did
to
New
York
City,
CITYLAB
(Mar.
5,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/what-airbnb-did-to-new-york-city/552749/
[https://perma.cc/F6JM-WWMG].
234. Soni Sangha, Eviction on Trial: Cities from New York to Minneapolis are
Providing Free Attorneys to Low-Income Tenants Facing Eviction, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2019-0122/cities-provide-lawyers-to-tenants-facing-eviction [https://perma.cc/KE29-Z6NX].
235. “Every major metropolitan area in the U.S. has a shortage of affordable and
available rental homes for extremely low-income renters.”, NAT’L LOW INCOME
HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 8 (2019),
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XYK-AGYU]. The same is true for every state. Id. at 1. In large
metropolitan areas, the shortage severity ranges from 13 affordable and available
rental homes to 51 for every 100 extremely low-income rent households. Id. at 8. In
states, the range is from 19/100 to 66/100. Id. at 1. There are more than 18 million rent
burdened households across the country of which nearly 10.7 million are severely
rent burdened. Id. at 5. “[R]enters with incomes below eighty percent of AMI
account for ninety-two percent of all cost-burdened renters.” Id.
236. Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 242–45 (2017);
John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 107–08
(2014). See generally Michael Hankinson, When Do Renters Behave Like
Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and Nimbyism, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473,
484 (2018) (arguing that development “presents a downside risk” to renters in the
form of the risk of displacement).
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focus on analyzing how best to design and test modern rent regulation
systems that enhance stability for current tenants while minimizing
adverse effects on investment in both new and existing rental housing.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to current debates that have largely left the particulars
of rent regulation unexamined, this Article centers on the details of
rent regulation ordinances, showing how different jurisdictions have
balanced the trade-offs inherent in rent regulation. This balancing
can be seen at all phases of rent regulation, from program design to
enforcement. Jurisdictions must decide how broadly to regulate; how
deregulation will occur; what kinds of costs and inflation will be
reflected in rent increases; and how to respond to both landlord and
tenant concerns. Jurisdictions must also decide the degree to which
rent regulation should be paired with other tenant protections — such
as harassment and eviction protections — that can potentially
increase tenant stability but make regulation more costly and less
flexible for landlords. Future research will hopefully help
practitioners, advocates, and policymakers better understand the
magnitude of these trade-offs in different market settings and guide
them towards more informed policy choices.

